The US and the Taliban have signed an "agreement for bringing peace" to Afghanistan after more than 18 years of conflict on 29 Feb 2020. The agreement outlines the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.
It also includes a Taliban guarantee that Afghan soil will not be used by foreign armed groups that would threaten the security of the US and its allies.
In a guarded reaction to the peace deal between the US and the Taliban, India on Saturday said its consistent policy has been to support all opportunities that can bring peace, security and stability in Afghanistan and ensure end of terrorism.
External Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Raveesh Kumar said, "India's consistent policy is to support all opportunities that can bring peace, security and stability in Afghanistan; end violence; cut ties with international terrorism; and lead to a lasting political settlement through an Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled process." He further said, "As a contiguous neighbour, India will continue to extend all support to the Government and people of Afghanistan in realising their aspirations for a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future where the interest of all sections of Afghan society are protected."
Meanwhile, India's Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla visited Afghanistan on Feb. 28-29 and conveyed New Delhi's support for Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled process for ensuring inclusive peace and reconciliation. This was his first visit abroad after taking over as India's foreign secretary a month ago.
Concluding a review of two recent additions to the compendium of Indian foreign policy analysis, one author writes: ‘India’s quiescent strategic culture means that Indian experts who wish to see their country match its surging economic means with a more geopolitically active posture will likely remain disappointed.’[1]
It will be argued that, since 2009, Delhi has been tailoring an Afghanistan policy that accords with India’s strategic regional interests and reflects a sober reassessment of its geopolitical limitations. The shift marks a return to India’s traditionally restrained policy, retaining flexibility in approach and a broad set of policy options without abandoning its core objectives. However, in an effort to spread the risks inherent in its engagement with Afghanistan, Delhi has embarked on a trajectory that requires apprehending its region as an opportunity rather than a constraint. Indeed, Delhi’s Afghanistan approach today demands that it engage constructively with regional actors if it is to secure its investments and accrue strategic dividends.
India has strategic and economic interests in Afghanistan that are bound up in its complex relationship with Pakistan. Primarily concerned with security, Indian objectives are easily reconciled with those of the international community: the creation of a stable Afghanistan that will no longer export terrorism. Adding a distinctly Indian layer to internationally shared concerns, Delhi perceives its own influence in Afghanistan as a useful countermeasure to a hostile Pakistan.[2]
India’s Afghanistan policy is not driven by ideological or humanitarian concerns. It is driven by a desire to limit Islamabad’s influence in Afghanistan. This is because increased Pakistani influence in Afghanistan may not only lead to a reduced Indian presence but will also make India more susceptible to Pakistani-inspired terrorism and marginal in the wider region. Delhi has initiated a programme of development assistance throughout Afghanistan with a view to cultivating a stable and friendly government in Kabul and goodwill amongst the population . In this sense, greater influence and increased stability are intertwined objectives and thus do not allow easy distinctions, adding to Pakistani suspicions.
Secondly, as a rapidly growing, energy-deficient country, India is keen to access Central Asian reserves of oil and natural gas. Afghanistan, which is also endowed with a wealth of extractable resources, can provide a convenient transit-way for these commodities. Being a gate way to Central Asia, the geo- strategic location of Afghanistan provides a shortest and most cost-effective route for channeling vast energy resources of Central Asia to the outside world. Similarly, a stable Afghanistan has the potential to be the over-ground nexus between regional markets, a convenience of significant benefit to the Indian economy.[3] (Here, too, India’s troubled relationship with Pakistan is a major impediment). Finally, aspiring to great power status, India envisages its efforts to stabilise Afghanistan as a means to harness international recognition as a global force for peace and progress, seeking external validation for its role as purveyor of regional security. India has remained disinclined to engage militarily in Afghanistan, exhibiting considerable strategic restraint.
Afghanistan has always been at risk of unwelcome external influences, primarily from the opportunistic neighbouring states. No regional state is prepared to allow another to gain a preponderance of influence in Afghanistan. Moreover, each retains links to client networks that are capable of fractionalizing and incapacitating an emerging Afghanistan.
China sees an opportunity in bringing all these countries together to form a unique front against growing India-US relationship in the region. There is formalization of relations going on among China-Pakistan-Russia-Iran on one hand, and on the other US-India-Afghanistan. Each country is crucial for the outcome of the Afghan problem, and each country has its own set of interests and its own strategies to gain maximum stronghold in the region.
Iran too has made bold strategic gambit in Afghanistan. Once a very strong rival of Pakistan-based insurgent groups, it now has its own calculations to support the Taliban in Afghanistan to keep it unstable and force the international community to leave Afghanistan.
India has never been able to make up its mind about Afghanistan, and now the stakes are higher, and more pressing, than ever. Should it engage, officially or unofficially, with Pakistan-backed groups such as the Afghan Taliban—or not? An unfolding breakthrough between the United States and the Taliban, which seems to promise a full U.S. troop withdrawal in 18 months if the Taliban pledge an enduring cease-fire, makes this long-standing dilemma suddenly especially acute.
With pull out of US from Afghanistan, India has but nearly lost influence Afghanistan. India’s room for manoeuvre in Afghanistan is constrained by structural aspects, such as its limited material capacities, reputational concerns, and lack of geographical contiguity. Unlike the United States, for instance, India does not have the financial resources to support state building in Afghanistan. In reputational terms, it values its role as a constructive regional player that has helped build the capacity of the Afghan state in economic, political and military terms.
There is no reason to doubt that Indian strategic quest in Afghanistan is motivated by her self-interest and not to stabilize Afghanistan as they project. There is also convincing evidence that geopolitical and geo strategic location of Afghanistan is an important motivational factor for India to gain pro Afghan govt through huge investment in the country. New Delhi requires partners both outside and inside Afghanistan to protect its presence and interests in the war-torn country.
Backed by the US, India can be a crucial player in Afghanistan. The US and India together can achieve more than what the US has been able to achieve till now. At the same time, it would send a strong message to subversive forces in the region that the Afghan peace process cannot be hostage to strategic interests of a few countries. It will highlight the fact that India has a crucial role to play in assisting the Afghan State to achieve peace, eliminate terrorism and stabilise the country.
[1] David J. Karl, ‘Is India Ready for Prime Time? (A review of David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy and Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military Modernisation),‟ Asian Policy #12 (July 2011), p.178
[2] C. Christine Fair, „Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India’s End Game in Afghanistan?‟ The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2011), p.181.
[3] Pant, Harsh V., (2010) ‘India in Afghanistan: A Test Case for a Rising Power,’ Contemporary South Asia 18:2 (June), p. 145
It also includes a Taliban guarantee that Afghan soil will not be used by foreign armed groups that would threaten the security of the US and its allies.
In a guarded reaction to the peace deal between the US and the Taliban, India on Saturday said its consistent policy has been to support all opportunities that can bring peace, security and stability in Afghanistan and ensure end of terrorism.
External Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Raveesh Kumar said, "India's consistent policy is to support all opportunities that can bring peace, security and stability in Afghanistan; end violence; cut ties with international terrorism; and lead to a lasting political settlement through an Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled process." He further said, "As a contiguous neighbour, India will continue to extend all support to the Government and people of Afghanistan in realising their aspirations for a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future where the interest of all sections of Afghan society are protected."
Meanwhile, India's Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla visited Afghanistan on Feb. 28-29 and conveyed New Delhi's support for Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled process for ensuring inclusive peace and reconciliation. This was his first visit abroad after taking over as India's foreign secretary a month ago.
Concluding a review of two recent additions to the compendium of Indian foreign policy analysis, one author writes: ‘India’s quiescent strategic culture means that Indian experts who wish to see their country match its surging economic means with a more geopolitically active posture will likely remain disappointed.’[1]
It will be argued that, since 2009, Delhi has been tailoring an Afghanistan policy that accords with India’s strategic regional interests and reflects a sober reassessment of its geopolitical limitations. The shift marks a return to India’s traditionally restrained policy, retaining flexibility in approach and a broad set of policy options without abandoning its core objectives. However, in an effort to spread the risks inherent in its engagement with Afghanistan, Delhi has embarked on a trajectory that requires apprehending its region as an opportunity rather than a constraint. Indeed, Delhi’s Afghanistan approach today demands that it engage constructively with regional actors if it is to secure its investments and accrue strategic dividends.
India has strategic and economic interests in Afghanistan that are bound up in its complex relationship with Pakistan. Primarily concerned with security, Indian objectives are easily reconciled with those of the international community: the creation of a stable Afghanistan that will no longer export terrorism. Adding a distinctly Indian layer to internationally shared concerns, Delhi perceives its own influence in Afghanistan as a useful countermeasure to a hostile Pakistan.[2]
India’s Afghanistan policy is not driven by ideological or humanitarian concerns. It is driven by a desire to limit Islamabad’s influence in Afghanistan. This is because increased Pakistani influence in Afghanistan may not only lead to a reduced Indian presence but will also make India more susceptible to Pakistani-inspired terrorism and marginal in the wider region. Delhi has initiated a programme of development assistance throughout Afghanistan with a view to cultivating a stable and friendly government in Kabul and goodwill amongst the population . In this sense, greater influence and increased stability are intertwined objectives and thus do not allow easy distinctions, adding to Pakistani suspicions.
Secondly, as a rapidly growing, energy-deficient country, India is keen to access Central Asian reserves of oil and natural gas. Afghanistan, which is also endowed with a wealth of extractable resources, can provide a convenient transit-way for these commodities. Being a gate way to Central Asia, the geo- strategic location of Afghanistan provides a shortest and most cost-effective route for channeling vast energy resources of Central Asia to the outside world. Similarly, a stable Afghanistan has the potential to be the over-ground nexus between regional markets, a convenience of significant benefit to the Indian economy.[3] (Here, too, India’s troubled relationship with Pakistan is a major impediment). Finally, aspiring to great power status, India envisages its efforts to stabilise Afghanistan as a means to harness international recognition as a global force for peace and progress, seeking external validation for its role as purveyor of regional security. India has remained disinclined to engage militarily in Afghanistan, exhibiting considerable strategic restraint.
Afghanistan has always been at risk of unwelcome external influences, primarily from the opportunistic neighbouring states. No regional state is prepared to allow another to gain a preponderance of influence in Afghanistan. Moreover, each retains links to client networks that are capable of fractionalizing and incapacitating an emerging Afghanistan.
China sees an opportunity in bringing all these countries together to form a unique front against growing India-US relationship in the region. There is formalization of relations going on among China-Pakistan-Russia-Iran on one hand, and on the other US-India-Afghanistan. Each country is crucial for the outcome of the Afghan problem, and each country has its own set of interests and its own strategies to gain maximum stronghold in the region.
Iran too has made bold strategic gambit in Afghanistan. Once a very strong rival of Pakistan-based insurgent groups, it now has its own calculations to support the Taliban in Afghanistan to keep it unstable and force the international community to leave Afghanistan.
India has never been able to make up its mind about Afghanistan, and now the stakes are higher, and more pressing, than ever. Should it engage, officially or unofficially, with Pakistan-backed groups such as the Afghan Taliban—or not? An unfolding breakthrough between the United States and the Taliban, which seems to promise a full U.S. troop withdrawal in 18 months if the Taliban pledge an enduring cease-fire, makes this long-standing dilemma suddenly especially acute.
With pull out of US from Afghanistan, India has but nearly lost influence Afghanistan. India’s room for manoeuvre in Afghanistan is constrained by structural aspects, such as its limited material capacities, reputational concerns, and lack of geographical contiguity. Unlike the United States, for instance, India does not have the financial resources to support state building in Afghanistan. In reputational terms, it values its role as a constructive regional player that has helped build the capacity of the Afghan state in economic, political and military terms.
There is no reason to doubt that Indian strategic quest in Afghanistan is motivated by her self-interest and not to stabilize Afghanistan as they project. There is also convincing evidence that geopolitical and geo strategic location of Afghanistan is an important motivational factor for India to gain pro Afghan govt through huge investment in the country. New Delhi requires partners both outside and inside Afghanistan to protect its presence and interests in the war-torn country.
Backed by the US, India can be a crucial player in Afghanistan. The US and India together can achieve more than what the US has been able to achieve till now. At the same time, it would send a strong message to subversive forces in the region that the Afghan peace process cannot be hostage to strategic interests of a few countries. It will highlight the fact that India has a crucial role to play in assisting the Afghan State to achieve peace, eliminate terrorism and stabilise the country.
[1] David J. Karl, ‘Is India Ready for Prime Time? (A review of David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy and Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming Without Aiming: India’s Military Modernisation),‟ Asian Policy #12 (July 2011), p.178
[2] C. Christine Fair, „Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India’s End Game in Afghanistan?‟ The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2011), p.181.
[3] Pant, Harsh V., (2010) ‘India in Afghanistan: A Test Case for a Rising Power,’ Contemporary South Asia 18:2 (June), p. 145
As such the durand line which was created by a foreigner will come into question again. All we need to do is sit back and enjoy the circus. 
