Opinion Can Sri Lanka manage to perform a balancing act between India and China ?

RISING SUN

Senior member
Dec 3, 2017
18,777
8,855
Can Sri Lanka manage to perform a balancing act between India and China ?
“It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia,” Chinese President Xi remarked at the 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. But can the two rapidly surging Asian countries live in co-existence and collaborate with one another, respecting each party’s security and economic concerns in their quest to ‘run the affairs of Asia’?
The following feature first appeared in the London School of Economics website
Over the years, China has demonstrated a growing aspiration to exert leadership through various multi-lateral platforms. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, BRICS, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) clearly manifest this desire. Incidentally, Sri Lanka is a member of the AIIB, and BRI and is a dialogue partner of the SCO. Among these initiatives, Chinese scholars view the BRI as the zenith of China’s projects, setting a new international order and a model for regional cooperation and international economic integration.
China and India: A tug of war
Undeniably BRI is redefining the China-India relationship notwithstanding India’s refusal to be part of it. The myriad of projects spanning Asia to Europe which come under the umbrella of BRI alongside Chinese soft and hard power strategies, demonstrates Beijing’s desire to replace or restructure America’s unipolarity with a world order of its own. Naturally, this increases the complexity and difficulty in mollifying fears, especially India’s concern, of a “Chinese Threat”.
The most important security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region, i.e. the US hub-and-spokes bi-lateral security system beheld Chinese inroads into regions once considered as America’s sphere of influence. China now boasts of a security involvement with the four principle sub-regions of Asia and the Pacific (North East Asia, South East Asia, South Asia and Central Asia).
Former Premier Wen Jiabao noted, “There is enough space in the world for the development of both China and India.” But many Indian scholars and think-tanks consider China’s incursions in South Asia as an effort to encircle India with a long-term intention of reducing India’s status and influence as a regional power.
Over the last few years tensions between the two states have been simmering. Beijing barred New Delhi from becoming a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, blocked India’s attempts to list Masood Azhar as a terrorist at the United Nations, and even routed its energy pipelines through disputed territory in Kashmir showcasing scant regard for India’s calls for the pipelines to be re-routed. A recent Pew Research survey captured this bubbling tension rather lucidly. According to its assessment, India’s public perception of China had declined from a 35 per cent favourable outlook in 2013 to just 26 per cent by 2017.
In 2017, China entered into a Free Trade Agreement with Maldives; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is in full swing and Nepal is presently increasingly inclined towards Beijing. Plans are already underway to establish a second Chinese military base in the Indian Ocean, this time in Pakistan close to the Chabahar Port in Iran, in which India has a significant stake. As China’s power and influence grows across India’s neighbours, New Delhi views this with undisguised apprehension. What should be Sri Lanka’s strategy in these changing and challenging times?
What next for Colombo?
There are diverse approaches states adopt when delineating their foreign policy. According to academics, small state foreign policy options include external balancing (building partnerships with external actors to counter a threat from the region), internal balancing (strengthening the country’s defence forces), bandwagoning (aligning with the dominant country), and hedging.
External balancing has no efficacy for Sri Lanka given the lack of military threat (regionally or extra-regionally) to the island. Bandwagoning with Beijing or New Delhi as well as hedging the two powers, remains unlikely given the island’s close economic ties with both. Both options involve choosing one party over the other, something Sri Lanka is not in a position to do. To emphasise this point a simple example suffices: The island’s largest portion of FDI in 2017 is from China followed closely by India. Conversely, Chinese tourist arrivals account for 13 per cent of total tourist arrivals to the island. This is second only to India.


Internal balancing alone remains impractical given the island’s weak defence capability when compared with that of regional powers. Indeed, internal balancing should be tied to a more concrete economic and political strategy. This strategy should be one of adopting a balanced approach while dealing with the two powers. A balanced foreign policy would necessitate friendly relations with Beijing and New Delhi without being partial towards one at the expense of the other. This grants Sri Lanka the ability to refrain from entangling in bi-lateral disputes between the two powers. Additionally, it allows the island to seek economic assistance from both powers while remaining neutral if and when a crisis emerges between New Delhi and Beijing.
Unlike the former Rajapakse regime, the present administration appears to realise the importance of maintaining a balanced approach in its foreign policy. This is evident from President Sirisena’s 2015 manifesto, which emphasised his desire to maintain “equal relations” with both states. Not only has the island demonstrated its recognition of Indian security concerns – clearly visible by Sri Lanka’s refusal to allow a Chinese nuclear submarine to dock when the Indian Prime Minister was visiting – but President Sirisena is also keen to utilise the growing affinity between himself and PM Modi to draw India to jointly manage operations in the Mattala Airport. As recently as November last year Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe visited New Delhi to meet PM Modi, and this month saw the two countries signing an MOU to enhance cooperation in areas of cyber security and e-Governance.
Given the strategic competition and growing rivalry outlined above, it is inherently in the island’s national interest to balance the two powers. Not only would this promote a healthy investment climate but it would also enable Sri Lanka to cultivate amicable ties with both powers even in a context where the two may not look eye to eye.
However, public outrage concerning the $8 billion of debt to Beijing and the degree of strategic competition between the two powers in the island has also raised complex issues. There are also concerns regarding the ‘debt to equity swap’ approach being followed by Sri Lanka. Will Sirisena’s decision to hand over the Hambantota Port on a 99 year lease to the China Merchant Port Holdings in return for writing-off of $1.1 billion of the island’s debt become a trademark of the Unity government’s foreign policy or will it simply be a one-off incident?
Continuing to rely on borrowing for the short-term health of the economy has proven to be an impractical option. Poor economic policies in the past put Sri Lanka’s financial autonomy and policy independence in jeopardy. While the Sirisena government has expressed its commitment to rectify this, the tendency to view such debt to equity swaps as a panacea to financial problems may exacerbate tensions on the domestic front.
- Shakthi De Silva is an undergraduate, specialising in International Relations with minors in Economics and Sociology from the University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. He has previously published in the Global – E Journal of the University of California, South Asia Journal, South Asian Voices and other platforms.
Sunday Times - Can Sri Lanka manage to perform a balancing act between India and China ?
 

Satellite image of ‘China’ in Sri Lanka ignites social media​

A satellite image showing a building located in Hambantota in the shape of the word ‘China’ created a buzz on social media yesterday (Monday).

Google Earth shows the building managed by China SLK Harbour Service at Mirijjawila-Sooriyawawa Road, Hambantota in the shape of the word China.

The image went viral on social media as from a distance, in the air, it looks like Hambantota was actually China.

Google Earth shows that the image was dated 4/2/2020 and the building is close to the Hambantota Port.

Among those who reacted to the image was the Canadian High Commissioner in Sri Lanka, David McKinnon.

“Maybe I should tell the architects designing the new @CanHCSriLanka to quit worrying about building something appropriate for #SriLanka and let their imagination run wild,” he tweeted.

Responding to the social media posts, the Chinese Embassy in Sri Lanka tweeted saying the building was designed as “China Loves SLK” by the Chinese company CHEC when constructing the Hambantota Port.
The Embassy said that the building had to be extended since the business operations of the port was increasing fast. (Colombo Gazette/Daily Mirror)
 

Lanka readies oil tank farm deal with India; Wang to visit Colombo after spat, may offer sweeteners​

China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi will visit Sri Lanka next week in the midst of a crippling economic crisis that has seen Colombo turn to Delhi for help and fast pedal the long-delayed India-Sri Lanka plan for joint development of the Trincomalee oil tank farm.

Wang Yi’s two-day visit, expected between January 7 and 9, will take place against the backdrop of a spat between the two countries over a contaminated consignment of organic fertiliser that has resulted in unexpected tensions between both countries.
After Colombo cancelled an order for the import of 99,000 tons of the fertiliser, Beijing blacklisted the Sri Lankan state-run People’s Bank and accused it of a “vicious” default on the letter of credit payment.


India angle: 1987 Accord​

INDIA’S INTEREST in the oil tank farm dates back to the signing of the 1987 India-Sri Lanka Accord, which stated in the annexure that the work of refurbishing the tank farm located in the north-eastern province of Trincomalee would be undertaken jointly by the two countries. The agreement lay dormant as first India and then Sri Lanka fought the Tamil Tigers. An attempted revival in 2003 went nowhere. In 2017, the two sides agreed to operationalise the long-standing agreement, but opposition from trade unions of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation held up any progress in the matter.

Earlier this month, with the Chinese company launching arbitration proceedings for a compensation of $8 milion, Sri Lanka drew a line under the controversy by agreeing to make a payment of $6.4 million.

Wang Yi’s visit will be significant for the sweeteners he may offer the Rajapaksa government to retrieve lost goodwill.

Meanwhile, Colombo is moving ahead on finalising plans for jointly developing with India a massive oil tank farm at Trincomalee. Although neither country is saying it in so many words, Delhi may offer in return financial assistance to help Sri Lanka tide over its present crisis.

“We have said that both matters should progress in parallel, and progress in one should reinforce the progress in the other towards strengthening economic ties,” said an official source, adding that the coming month may see important developments on the Trincomalee oil tank farm deal.

Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves sank to $1.6 billion at the end of November. The shortage has led to a drop in food imports, pushing up prices of essentials in the country. An IMF bailout is the last option that Sri Lanka does not wish to take.

Earlier this month, international ratings agency Fitch downgraded Sri Lanka from CCC to CC, warning that the country was likely to default on two international sovereign bonds, one coming up in January 2022 for $500 million, and another due in July for $1 billion.

The Central Bank of Sri Lanka termed Fitch’s action “hasty” and said it had not taken into account Colombo’s diplomatic outreach to friendly countries for help with financial assistance. A statement from the bank said cash flows were expected by the end of December 2021 and March 2022.

“The government and the Central Bank remain confident that these inflows will materialise and the end-2021 level of Gross Official Reserves will remain above USD 3 billion. Fitch appears to have ignored the standby SWAP facility with the People’s Bank of China of around USD 1.5 billion,” the media release said.

Apart from loans and Foreign Currency Term Financing agreements with China during the year, Sri Lanka signed the three-year “standby” swap agreement with Beijing in March 2021. The Central Bank Governor said earlier this month that the government may draw on this to pay for imports from China.

But Colombo has also appealed to India for help. Sri Lankan Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa, who visited Delhi in November, was offered a “four-pronged package” – a line of credit for fuel impoorts only from India; early finalisation of the joint India-Sri Lank development plan for the Trincomalee oil tank farm; an offer of a currency swap to help Lanka pay its foreign debt and facilitation of Indian investments in different sectors.

Earlier this week, the Sri Lankan weekly Sunday Times reported that Energy Minister Udaya Gammanpila had instructed the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) chairman to form a subsidiary company, Trinco Petroleum Terminal Ltd, which will be the special purpose vehicle for the India-Sri Lanka joint development of the Trincomalee oil tank farm.

The decision is expected to be approved at a Cabinet meeting next week. The newspaper reported that President Gotabya Rajapaksa had given approval for the formation of the subsidiary.
 

China defends military ship's planned visit to India's neighbour Sri Lanka​

BEIJING/NEW DELHI, July 29 (Reuters) - China said on Friday it hoped "relevant parties" would refrain from interfering with its legitimate maritime activities, after New Delhi voiced concern over a Chinese military ship's planned visit to a port in India's southern neighbour Sri Lanka.

India worries that the Chinese-built and leased port of Hambantota will be used by China as a military base in India's backyard. The $1.5 billion port is near the main shipping route from Asia to Europe.

Shipping data from Refinitiv Eikon showed Chinese research and survey vessel Yuan Wang 5 was en route to Hambantota and due to arrive on Aug. 11, at a time when Sri Lanka is facing its worst economic crisis in seven decades. India has provided Sri Lanka with nearly $4 billion in support this year alone.

During a weekly briefing late on Thursday, an Indian foreign ministry spokesman said the government was monitoring the planned visit of the Chinese ship, adding that New Delhi would protect its security and economic interests. read more


India has already lodged a verbal protest with the Sri Lankan government against the ship's visit, Reuters reported on Thursday.

In response to questions from Reuters, China's foreign ministry said Beijing had always exercised freedom of the high seas lawfully.

"China hopes that the relevant parties will view and report on China's marine scientific research activities correctly and refrain from interfering with normal and legitimate maritime activities," the ministry said in a statement.


Relations between India and China have been strained since armed clashes on their border two years ago killed at least 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers and led to a massive build-up of troops on both sides.

Foreign security analysts describe the Yuan Wang 5 as one of China’s latest generation space-tracking ships, used to monitor satellite, rocket and intercontinental ballistic missile launches.

The Pentagon’s annual report on China’s military modernisation says the Yuan Wang ships are operated by the Strategic Support Force of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

A Sri Lankan consulting firm, the Belt & Road Initiative Sri Lanka, said on its website that the Yuan Wang 5 would be in Hambantota for a week and "conduct space tracking, satellite control and research tracking in the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean region through August and September".

Sri Lanka formally handed over commercial activities at its main southern port to a Chinese company in 2017 on a 99-year lease after struggling to repay its debt.

China is one of Sri Lanka's biggest lenders and has also funded airports, roads and railways, unnerving India, which is now trying to claw back lost ground.

Sri Lanka angered India in 2014 when it allowed a Chinese submarine and a warship to dock in Colombo.